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It is doubtful whether the court meant to commit itself on the
question of recovery on the'theory of implied warranty where no privity
of contract exists; yet the language of the court allows the conclusion
that such a problem when presented will receive liberal treatment. For
a discussion of this problem, see 4 O.S.L.J. 403.
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TORTS
RELEASE BY THE SOLE BENEFICIARY UNDER THE WRONGFUL
DEATH ACT
Ralph Pilkington, a minor, was injured by defendant on April 7,
1934. His mother, who was his next of kin and sole beneficiary under
the Wrongful Death Act, made application to the probate judge for
consent to a settlement for $495 without the appointment of a guardian
as provided in General Code, section 10507-I9. The court gave its
consent and ordered payment by defendant and execution of a release
by Mrs. Pilkington (for Ralph) of any and all claims arising out of the
accident and injuries. This release was executed on May 24, 1934, and
on the same day, Mrs. Pilkington in consideration of $225 executed
another release of all actions or claims she had or might have in the
future as sole beneficiary under the wrongful death statute. The son
died July 2, 1935, from the results of the injury, and the present action
for wrongful death was brought by his administratrix for the next of
kin. The court of appeals stated that the release by the decedent would
not bar such an action, but held that the additional release by the sole
beneficiary prior to the death of the injured person constituted a valid
defense to any action subsequently brought by the personal representative
of the deceased under the wrongful death statute. Pilkington. v. Sans,
25 Ohio L. Abs. 663 (Ohio App. 1938).
In reiterating the doctrine that a settlement and release by the
decedent is no defense to an action for wrongful death brought by his
personal representative after his death, the court once again states the
minority view which has, as yet, been followed by the courts of Ohio.
General Code, section I05o9-i66 gives the personal representative an
action to be brought for the benefit of the next of kin "when the death
of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default such as would
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover dam-
ages in respect thereof, if death had not ensued. . . . " There are like
provisions in the statutes of all states. The earlier Ohio cases held that a
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settlement by the decedent was a defense to such an action. "If the
deceased in his lifetime has debarred himself from recovery, he has no
cause of action to which the statutory cause could succeed. It prevents
an action from arising in favor of the next of kin and precludes his
administratrix from recovering upon a liability which the deceased in
his lifetime by his own act discharged." The Solor Refining Co. v.
Ellott, 8 Ohio C.D. 225, 15 Ohio C.C. 581 (1898). "Should the
injured party be compensated in his lifetime, no action can be maintained
by his administrator or next of kin for damages." Helman v. The P.,
C., & St. L. Ry. Co., 58 Ohio St. 400, 5o N.E. 986, 41 L.R.A. 86o
(1898).
Shortly thereafter, however, the seed of the present contrary doc-
trine was sown by the Supreme Court in Railway Co. v. Van 41stine,
77 Ohio St. 395, 83 N.E. 6ol, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 893 (908). In
that case, in holding that a recovery by the personal representative in
a survivor action under General Code, section i 1235 did not bar an
action for wrongful death, the court said: "The two actions, although
prosecuted by the same personal representative, are not in the same
right, and hence a recovery and satisfaction in one case is not a bar to
a recovery in the other."
Enlarging upon this statement, the court in Maguire v. Cin. Trac-
tion Co., 14 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 431, 230 Ohio C.D. 24 (i9ii), held
that a release by the decedent did not bar an action for the next of kin
and stated: "We do not think it is within the power of the party injured,
by any act of his subsequent to the injury, to bar this action." The court's
interpretation of the statute was that the death of the injured party gave
a new cause of action entirely independent of the injured person's or his
personal representative's right to recover for the wrong. The wrongful
act must be of such a character as would have entitled the injured person
to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof. "Cir-
cumstances of the accident or injury determine the right of such action
and not whether the deceased had an action which he could have main-
tained at his death." The same construction was used in Coal Co. v.
Robinette, 120 Ohio St. iio, i65 N.E. 576, 64 A.L.R. 441 (1929).
However there is a possibility in the Maguire case that the court was
influenced by the fact that the settlement was made with the decedent
for $25.
In Phillips, Adm'x v. Community Traction Co., 46 0. App. 483,
189 N.E. 444, 7 Ohio Bar 291 (motion to certify overruled-i 9 3 3 ),
the court allowed recovery by the administratrix for the benefit of the
children even though both the injured wife and the husband had
executed separate releases.
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A few jurisdictions take a similar stand. The California courts so
hold, saying that there is a new cause of action with a different measure
of damages from that which accrued to the injured person. Earley v.
Pac. Electric Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 79, 167 Pac. 513, L.R.A. 1918A 997
(917). The Massachusetts courts hold there is a new cause of action
giving a penalty to the heir for the death of the injured person and that
the injured person has no control over it. Wall, Executrix v. Mass.
Northeastern St. Ry. Go., 229 Mass. 5o6, II8 N.E. 864 (I918). The
Massachusetts statute gives a penalty in fact, however, and by doing so
expresses the legislature's intention that the decedent be not able to
relieve the tort-feasor from the action.
On the other hand, most jurisdictions take a contrary view of the
effect of a release by the decedent. "The widow and child of one who
has settled with and released the party liable for his injuries, cannot
maintain an action for his subsequent death resulting from the same
injuries." Thompson v. Fort Worth & Rio Grande Ry. Co., 97 Tex.
59 o , 8o S.W. 990 (1904). "A widow has no independent right of
action for the death of her husband caused by negligence or default of
another which he could not release in his lifetime, after injury and before
death." Hill v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., 178 Pa. 223, 35 Ad. 997, 35
L.R.A. 196 (1896). See note 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 176. "An action
for wrongful death is barred by a release executed by the decedent."
Lindsay v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 226 Fed. 23, 141 C.C.A. 131
(1915); Perry v. Philadelphia, B. & WV. R. Co., i Boyce (Del.) 336,
77 Ad. 725 (19io); 8 R.C.L. 786; Fuller v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 124 Kan. 66, 257 Pac. 971 (1927); Tiffany, Death By
Wrongful Act, 269.
It is true that a few of these jurisdictions hold, in interpreting the
wrongful death statute, that it does not create a new cause of action
but that it is merely a successor to the decedent's action for personal
injuries. The majority, however, agree with Ohio courts that it creates
a new cause of action but differ on the effect of a release by the decedent.
The reasoning of these latter courts is well stated in Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Cassin, iii Ga. 575, 36 S.E. 881, 5o L.R.A. 694
(i9oo): "The statute gives rise to a new cause of action and thus there
are two actions that may be maintained by the personal representative
(survivor action and the action for wrongful death). But they are not
independent; they are concurrent and connected. Both arise from the
injury which is wiped out by a release and settlement by the deceased
before his death." Of course, in all the states the release can be avoided
for fraud or because the decedent was not sui juris.
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The principal argument advanced against the Ohio court's refusal to
recognize a release by the injured person as a valid defense to a subse-
quent wrongful death action is that it makes the tort-feasor pay twice
for the same wrong. The Ohio courts deny this because they say the
statute gives a new and separate cause of action entirely divorced from
the one that the injured person had. Yet it is well to note that, although
allowing the survivor action and the wrongful death action to be main-
tained concurrently, all courts, including those of Ohio, limit the ele-
ments of damage recoverable in each. "One is for the wrong to the
injured person and is confined to his personal loss and suffering before
he died, while the other is for the wrong to the beneficiaries and is
confined to their pecuniary loss through his death." Coal Co. v. Robin-
tte, sutra; Railway Co. v. Van 1lstine, supra. The Ohio courts are
particular to see that these elements of damage do not overlap.
The elements of damage considered in a settlement and release
include not only medical services, pain and suffering of the injured
person, but also include the pecuniary loss to his dependents resulting
from his present disability and his incapacity to provide for them in the
future. The amount received in the settlement accrues to the estate and
passes to the next of kin. Yet these same Ohio courts, in refusing to
hold the release to be a defense in a wrongful death action, take no
cognizance of a possibility of twice compensating the next of kin for
the same mishap or of making the tort-feasor pay twice for the same
wrong. In addition to this unfortunate result, the Ohio courts are also
turning their backs on a well established policy-that of encouraging the
settling of disputes without litigation and without delay.
In states other than Ohio, if the injured party lives long enough
to prosecute a suit against the tort-feasor and recover from him, then
such recovery will be a valid defense to a wrongful death action after
his death. "While the right of action given to the personal representative
is a new cause of action which does not arise until after death, yet the
decedent's recovery of damages for the injuries which resulted in his
death is a bar to an action by his personal representative for a wrongful
death." Golding v. Town of Knox, 56 Ind. App. 149, 104 N.E. 978
(1914); Harrs v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., iii Miss. 623, 71 So. 878
(1916); Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 244 Ill. App. 427
(1928). Ohio has also held that a prior recovery by the deceased bars
an action for wrongful death. 4iston, Idm'r v. C., C., C. & I. R. R.
Co., i Ohio C.D. 353, 2 Ohio C.C. 45 (1886). The courts of this
state since have held that a recovery by the administrator on the survivor
action ( where damages are limited to certain elements) is no defense
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to the action for wrongful death, yet it has never been held that a suit
and recovery by the decedent prior to his death is no defense to the
subsequent action. If the Ohio courts make this distinction between the
effect of a release by the decedent and of an action and recovery by the
decedent, it seems inconsistent and unjustified.
In Connors, Adm'x v. New York Central Ry., 20 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 573, 29 Ohio D. 64 (1918), after deciding that the Federal
Employers' Liability Act conferred the survivor and the wrongful death
actions in the alternative, thereby giving validity as a defense to a release
by the decedent, the court said, "The case at bar furnishes a fair
example of what would otherwise occur under the circumstances. The
employee settled for damages for total disability. Then to allow the
personal representative to recover on behalf of the beneficiaries named
in the statute would be to recover twice from the defendant for one
injury. It would violate one of the fundamental principles of the law
of damages; and so to construe an act of Congress as to obtain this
result would equally violate one of the fundamental principles of statu-
tory construction."
However, until the Supreme Court sees fit to interpret differently
the effect of a release by the decedent, Ohio has taken the minority
stand, discouraging settlement and making the wrongdoer pay twice
for his default if he obtains a release from the decedent.
In Pilkington v. Saas, supra, an Ohio court for the first time held
that a release by the sole beneficiary before the death of the injured
person, coupled with the latter's release, will be a valid defense to an
action by the personal representative after the death has occurred. The
only case approaching the problem was Cullison, ildm'r v. B. & 0.
R. R. Co. 4 Ohio N.P. 360, 7 Ohio N.P. 602, 7 Ohio D.N.P. 269
(1897). Therein the court stated, "Where the widow, the sole bene-
ficiary, there being no children, accepts from the relief department of
a railroad company the money stipulated in a contract of release from
further liability, she cannot afterwards in her character as administratrix
bring an action for wrongful death."
This holding is in accord with the decisions in other jurisdictions.
"Before the administrator is appointed, the sole beneficiary may com-
promise, settle and give a binding release of the death claim, good as
against an administrator thereafter appointed." Fischer v. Pope, 229
Ala. 170, 155 So. 579 (i934)- "In an action for death, the defendant
would be entitled to assert as a defense a release executed by the
decedent's heirs at law." Peters v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co.,
191 S.E. 58i (937); Story v. Page, 28o Mich. 34, 273 N.W. 384
(i937); Tiffany, Death By Wrongful lct, 269.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 127
The release made by the beneficiary before the death of the injured
person must expressly include release from all claims and actions which
might be had in the future by the beneficiary in respect of the injuries
as well as present claims and actions. If there be more than one bene-
ficiary under the wrongful death statute, then a settlement and release
by one beneficiary does not bar the action for the benefit of the others.
B. & 0. ..R. Co. v. Hottman, i Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 17, 15 Ohio C.D.
140; 17 C.J. 1247 (1903); Pltllps, Adm'r v. Community Traction
Co., supra.
Before the Pilkington case, insurance companies and other claim
adjustors made the practice of having the beneficiaries join in the release
with the injured person and then, to provide for the possibility of the
release being held not to constitute a defense, had the beneficiaries also
sign a contract of indemnity to the tort-feasor for any actions or claims
arising out of the injuries in the future.
There is a split in the different jurisdictions as to the effect of a
settlement and release directly with the beneficiary after the death of
the injured party and after the personal representative has been appointed.
A few states have taken the position that, since the wrongful death
statute gives the personal representative the right to settle the claim with
the consent of the probate court, the right to settle and release is exclu-
sively in him and the beneficiary is powerless to do so. Louisvlle v.
Hart's Adm'rs, 143 Ky. 171, 136 S.W. 212, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 207
(i9 1 ). Ohio seems to follow this view inBaltimore and Ohio R.R.
Co. v. McCamey, 12 Ohio C.C. 543, 5 Ohio C.D. 631 (1896),
wherein the court says, "The statute gave a cause of action to the per-
sonal representative, and so, when the beneficiary released, she released
no right of action she might have had against the railroad company,
because she had none." However, this statement by the court is purely
dictum since there were other beneficiaries under the statute besides the
one who released, and the court did not decide whether or not this one
could share in the proceeds of the wrongful death action.
The majority of the courts, however, find that the beneficiary has
power to make a valid settlement with the wrongdoer although an action
on such a claim must be brought by the personal representative of the
deceased. McKeigue v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 130 Wis. 543,
iio N.W. 384, ii L.R.A. (N.S.) 148, Ii8 Am. St. Rep. 1038
(907). The courts have not directly met this problem as yet, but,
with the Pilkington case as precedent, it seems likely that they will see
fit to follow the majority view as expressed in Fetty v. Carroll et al.,
19o S.E. 683 (1937): "Under the code an action for wrongful death
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is for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's next of kin; and, while the
decedent's administrator alone may sue, his relation to any fund recov-
ered is not that of the decedent's representative, but that of trustee for
the next of kin. It would, therefore, seem the thing to do to admit any
defense against him which would be a defense against them."
The possibility of now joining the beneficiary with the decedent in
the release, in many cases, does not help to counteract the unfortunate
result of Ohio's position on the effect of a release by the decedent alone.
There are still problems presented where the beneficiaries are minors
and cannot release, or where the tort-feasor overlooks or does not know
of one or more of the beneficiaries (especially if he be a non-resident of
the state), and thus a necessary signature is missing from the release.
JAMES M. GORMAN
TRUSTS
THE RIGHT OF CREDITORS TO REACH THE CESTUI'S INTEREST
The defendant and his wife conveyed certain property to trustees
under a trust device, naming themselves and their five children, or their
heirs as beneficiaries. It was provided that the defendant was to receive
one thousand dollars a year from the income of the fund so long as he
acted as the manager of a business enterprise and thereafter he was to
receive five hundred dollars per year for life in the form of a pension,
but in the event the business were unprofitable for three years the
trustee was authorized to sell the property and distribute the proceeds
as therein provided, in which event the defendant was not to participate
in the distribution. The plaintiffs subsequently recovered a judgment
against the defendant and execution was returned unsatisfied. They
then sought, by proceedings in aid of execution, to subject his interest
in the trust to the payment of their claim. The defendant's salary
account was overdrawn at the time these proceedings were instituted.
The court denied recovery to the plaintiffs, saying that the defendant's
interest in the fund "is too uncertain as to duration to be subject of an
order in aid, except as to definite sums as they accrue to him."* This
*Kuhn, et al.t v. Wolf, 59 Ohio App. iS (1938).
case is illustrative of the problem facing the creditor whose debtor is the
cestui of trust having no other property subject to the payment of his
obligations.
In undertaking to set forth the principles governing creditors' pro-
cedure in reaching such interests, the first part of this paper will be given
